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Has support of the aged by families declined in the postwar period? While the 
jury is still out, there is substantial evidence pointing in that direction. Over 
60 percent of the elderly (those over 60) now live alone, compared with only 
25 percent in the 1940s. For the old old (those over 85), the fraction living 
alone has increased from 13 to 57 percent. At the same time, there has been 
more  than  a tripling of  the rate  of  institutionalization; today  almost one- 
quarter of the old old live in institutions, compared with only 7 percent in the 
1940s (Sandefur and Tuma  1987). In addition to not living with the elderly, 
the children of the elderly rarely provide financial transfers to the elderly (Kot- 
likoff  and Morris 1989), and when they do, the amounts are typically quite 
meager. 
One defense of the children’s behavior is demographic; the current number 
of  children per elderly parent totals about half the number observed in the 
1940s. Since the elderly of today had fewer children than did their parents and 
have, in some cases, succeeded in outliving their children, the current situa- 
tion may be much of their own making. A second defense is that the relative 
income position of  the elderly has improved, permitting them to live alone 
(Michael, Fuchs, and Scott 1980) and obviating the need for financial trans- 
fers from their children. A variety of  studies (e.g., Boskin, Kotlikoff, and 
Knetter 1985; and Andrews and Hurd 1990) have demonstrated that current 
poverty rates of the elderly are close to, if not below, those of the nonelderly. 
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Much of the improvement in the relative incomes of  the elderly is due to in- 
creases in real Social Security benefits legislated in the 1970s. A third point 
to consider in  assessing child support of  the elderly involves payment for 
nursing home care. A good fraction of the elderly in nursing homes are private 
pay  patients. Some of  these payments are being made directly by  children. 
While we  are not  aware of  time-series data on nursing home payments by 
children, it seems plausible that such payments per child measured at constant 
dollars have increased over time. 
While the elderly may need and appear to be receiving less financial help 
from their children, their needs for companionship and physical assistance 
may well have increased in the postwar period; the increased longevity of the 
elderly often means living for years in poor states of health. In addition, those 
elderly who continue to live will lose a large fraction of their old friends and 
even some of  their children along the way.  Most studies of the increasingly 
separate living arrangements of the elderly conclude that these arrangements 
reflect the preferences and improved financial means of  the elderly. In con- 
trast, Kotlikoff and Morris (1990) suggest that about half the elderly would 
prefer to live with their children but continue to live apart because of  their 
children’s preferences coupled with their children’s financial abilities to live 
apart from their parents. 
One reason the jury remains out on family support of the aged involves the 
issue of time spent by children with their elderly parents. As Morgan’s (1984) 
research suggests, children’s provision of  time to their elderly parents is an 
important, if not the most important, form of economic transfer to the elderly 
by their children. This paper studies the provision of time by  children to their 
elderly parents. We  use the 1986 Hebrew Rehabilitation Center for the Aged 
(HRCA) follow-up survey of Massachusetts elderly and the 1986 HRC-NBER 
survey of  the children of these Massachusetts elderly. While the child survey 
involved an interview of only one of the children of the elderly (the one des- 
ignated by the elderly), each child was asked a set of detailed questions not 
only about his or her own circumstances but also about the circumstances of 
each of  his or her siblings. The combined data are unique in their detail of 
demographic and economic characteristics of  the elderly and each of  their 
children. 
We  use these data to answer a number of questions about the provision of 
time by  children to  their parents.  These questions include, How  does the 
health status of  the elderly influence the amount of time given by children? 
How does the health status of the children influence their provision of time to 
their parents? Do parents with more income and wealth receive more time 
from their children? How do the employment status and wage rates of children 
affect their provision of time? Do children free ride on their siblings’ provision 
of time? Are home care corporations used by children as a substitute for their 
own time? Do the institutionalized elderly receive more or less time? Are 
daughters, other things being equal, more or less likely to provide time? 
We  take two empirical approaches in studying the data. First, we estimated 111  The Provision of Time to the Elderly 
Tobits for the provision of time by children. Second, we estimate a structural 
model of the joint decision of  children to work and to provide time to their 
elderly parent. Since the opportunity cost of providing time to the parent for 
working children is the wage, the structural model indicates how wage rates 
influence the allocation of time by children to the elderly. The model can ac- 
count for comer solutions in the data; this is important because some children 
do not work, some do not provide time to their parents, and some neither work 
nor provide time. 
Our model assumes that the child is altruistic in that he or she cares about 
the utility the parent receives from their time spent together. The model does 
not, however, consider the utility the child might derive from the consumption 
of the parent. Including the utility of parent’s consumption in the child’s utility 
function would require an analysis of financial transfers from children to par- 
ents. But given that only 2.6 percent of  children in our sample report making 
financial transfers to their elderly parent(s), the extra complications of mod- 
eling financial transfers seems to outweigh the potential  benefits. ‘ While we 
ignore financial transfers, the model does consider the simultaneous decisions 
by siblings as to how much time each sibling should provide the parent. The 
model assumes that each sibling takes time provided to the parent  as given; 
that is, the siblings play noncooperative Nash. 
Another issue not considered by the model is the possibility  that children 
are not altruistic but,  in effect, sell their time (2 la Bernheim,  Shleifer, and 
Summers 1985) to their parents.  The quid pro quo for this sale of time is a 
financial payment by parents to their children. But such transfers are also quite 
rare  in  our  sample:  only  0.9 percent  of  children report  receiving  financial 
transfers from their parents. In addition, as described below, children receiv- 
ing financial transfers from their parents are no more likely to provide time to 
their parents than those not receiving transfers. While the possibility remains 
that parents pay for time transfers by leaving larger future bequests, it is not 
clear how one would estimate the magnitude of such contingent payments. 
Section 4.1 presents our simple structural model. Section 4.2 describes the 
data and  our sample selection.  Section 4.3 presents Tobit estimates of  the 
allocation of time by children to their parents as well as estimates of the struc- 
tural model. Section 4.4 concludes the paper with a summary of our findings. 
4.1  A Simple Structural Model of the Joint Labor Supply 
and Time Provision Decisions 
4.1.1  The Model 
Our model assumes that the child’s utility is logarithmic and depends on his 
or her consumption, leisure, and the total amount of time the parent receives 
1. The mean amount of transfers from children to parents, when positive, is $2,159 per year. 112  A. Borsch-Supan, J. Gokhale, L. J. Kotlikoff, and J. N. Morris 
from him or her and his or her siblings. The utility function of sibling i, Ui,  is 
given by 
N, 
U, = a  log C, + p log CI + log(d, + cd, + m)  (1) 
In (l),  a,  p, and m are constants. The terms C,, e,,  d,, and d,  (j  #  i)  stand, 
respectively, for consumption of child i, leisure of child i, time provided to 
the parent by child i, and time provided to the parent by siblingj. There are N, 
siblings of child i. The displacement value rn (which we set equal to one) in 
the logarithm of time received by the parent permits the possibility that child 
i provides zero time to his or her parent even if all his or her siblings also 
provide zero time. 
The child maximizes this function subject to constraints (2),  (3),  and (4): 
If! 
Ci 5  Wi(l - ti - di) + Y,, 
di 2  0, 
di + ti  5 1. 
Equation (2) says that consumption cannot exceed labor earnings plus exoge- 
nous income, Yi.  Equation (2) says that time provided to the parent cannot be 
negative, and equation (3) says that the sum of  leisure time plus time spent 
with the parent cannot exceed the endowment of time that is normalized to 
unity. 
Since (2) will always be binding, solutions for the values of ti  and di satisfy: 
(1 -  di - ti)  = 0, 
a  Wi 
wi(i - ei -  di) + yi  ei 
(5) 
Letting [  1,  and [  Ib stand, respectively, for the values in the square brackets 
in (5) and (6),  we have the following four cases: 
1.  d, + e, = 1 and di = 0 (the child is retired and provides no time) hold 
2. d, + ti = 1 and di > 0 (the child is retired and provides time) hold  if 
3.  di + Ci < 1 and di = 0 (the child works and provides no time) hold  if 
4. di + t,  < 1 and  di > 0 (the  child works  and  provides  times) hold  if 
if  [  1,  > 0 and [  lb  <O. 
[  1,  > Oand [  Ib = 0. 
[  1.  = Oand [  Ib < 0. 
[  1,  = Oand [  Ib = 0. 113  The Provision of Time to the Elderly 
4.1.2  Estimation 
The condition [  1,  2 0 implies 
iog[w,(i -  e, -  d,) + Y,] -  iog(w,e,) 5 log  -  log p,, 
and the condition [  Ib I; 0 implies 
loge, - iog(d, + c  +,d,  + m) I  log  p,. 
In these expressions, each child has individual-specific preference parame- 
ters,  that  is,  cx  and  p  are  subscripted  by  i.  We  let  log a,  =  + 
k.,  and log p, = .x:+  + u,,  where XI is a vector of  characteristics of  child i 
and his or her parent(s), 0 and +  are coefficient vectors, and k, and u,  are mean 
zero independent normal errors with bivariate densityflb,, u,). Define 
H, = iog[w,(i - e, -  d,) + YJ - iog(w,e,) -  X:e  + .,’+ 
z,  = log e, - iog(d, + c,,,d,  + m) -  x;+, 
and 
then HI 2 F, -  u,  and 2, I  u,. The probability of observing child i working 
and providing time can now be expressed as 
(7)  Pr(H, = p, -  u, and Z,  = u,) = AH, + Z,, ZJ, 
where H, and Z, are evaluated at the observed values of e,  and d,. 
The probability of observing child i retired and providing time is 
(8) 
where Hi and Zi  are evaluated at the observed value of d, and e, is evaluated at 
one minus the observed value of d,. 
The probability of observing child i retired and providing no time is 
where Hi and Z,  are evaluated di = 0 and ti  = 1. 
The probability of observing child i working and providing no time is 
where Hi and Zi  are evaluated at di  = 0 and ti  equals one minus the observed 
amount of time child i spends working. 
Denote L, as the probability of the observed labor supply and time provision 
of child k, then the likelihood, L, of the sample with N observations is 114  A. Borsch-Supan, J. Gokhale, L. J. Kotlikoff, and J. N. Morris 
N 
L  = nL,. 
k=  I 
4.2  The Data, Sample Section Criteria, and Data Characteristics 
4.2.1  The 1986 HRCA Elderly Survey and the 1986 HRC-NBER Child 
Survey 
The 1986 HRCA Survey of the Elderly is part of an ongoing panel survey 
of Massachusetts elderly that began in 1982. In addition to the 1982 and 1986 
surveys,  the  elderly  sample was  reinterviewed  in  1984,  1985,  1987, and 
1989. The 1986 HRC-NBER Child Survey is a survey of the children of those 
elderly interviewed in the  1986 HRCA Survey of  the Elderly. One child of 
each elderly respondent was interviewed and asked a set of questions concern- 
ing his or her household, parents, and siblings. 
The original 1982 stratified sample of 3,856 elderly individuals was drawn 
from two populations. The first population, accounting for 2,674 of  the el- 
derly in the total sample, was drawn from communities in Massachusetts. In 
forming the community sample, the state of Massachusetts was divided into 
twenty-seven home care areas.  Within each  home care area,  communities 
were stratified, on the basis of population, into large, medium, and small, and 
communities within each of the three groups were selected at random. Next, 
HRCA  used  Massachusetts police records,  which  record the ages and  ad- 
dresses of all Massachusetts residents, to stratify the elderly by  age, separat- 
ing those age 75 and older from those younger than age 75. Elderly individu- 
als within each subgroup were then randomly selected. The community and 
age stratifications produced an intentional overrepresentation of the old old as 
well as the elderly living in rural communities. 
The second population, which accounts for the remaining 1,182 elderly in 
the 1982 survey, was drawn from elderly participants of all twenty-seven Mas- 
sachusetts home health care corporations. In this sample, the elderly were 
again stratified by  age, and the older old were oversampled. The sample’s 
selection procedures are described in more detail in Morris et al. (1987). The 
1982 sample of the elderly included only the noninstitutionalized elderly, but 
each subsequent survey has followed the initial sample as they changed resi- 
dences, including moving into and out of nursing homes. 
Each of the HRCA Surveys of the Elderly include detailed questions about 
living arrangements and health status. The  1986 reinterview of  the elderly 
also contains a series of  questions of  the elderly about their children. These 
questions include the names, sexes, frequency and type of contact with chil- 
dren, the extent of financial aid given to and received from children, and the 
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activities of daily living. In addition, the 1986 survey contains a set of ques- 
tions about the elderly respondent’s income and wealth. 
At the close of the HRCA elderly survey, the elderly respondent was asked 
for permission to contact one of  his or her children and ask that child to partic- 
ipate in our child survey. While a random selection of the child respondents 
would have been preferable, it was felt that the elderly respondents would be 
more cooperative if they were allowed to make the selection. Because of fund- 
ing  limitations,  we  were  able to  sample only children of  the  community 
sample of elderly; that is, we  were not able to contact children of the home 
care sample of elderly. As mentioned, the community sample of elderly is a 
stratified random sample of noninstitutionalized elderly. 
Like the HRCA Surveys of the Elderly, the HRC-NBER Child Survey is a 
telephone interview. The Child Survey is roughly forty-five minutes in length. 
Interviews with the child’s spouse were conducted if  the child was not avail- 
able.  The  questions in  the Child  Survey concerning the  respondent’s and 
spouse’s characteristics include age,  marital status, number of  young  chil- 
dren, work and health status, occupation, industry, education, grades in high 
school, income, and wealth. These questions are also asked of the respondent 
about his or her siblings. In addition, the child was asked to indicate (1) the 
frequency of  contact between each sibling and each sibling’s spouse and the 
HRCA elderly respondent parent, (2) the amount of financial assistance each 
sibling and his or her spouse give to or receive from the HRCA elderly respon- 
dent parent, and (3) the amount of  time each sibling and his or her spouse 
spends with the HRCA elderly respondent per month. The child is also asked 
about his or her parents’ and in-laws’ health status as well as his or her par- 
ents’ income and net wealth. 
The sample size of the initial 1982 Survey of the Elderly is 3,856. In con- 
trast, the 1986 completed sample size of elderly was 2,889, with 22.5 percent 
of the attrition since 1982 due to death. In the 1986 data, over 90 percent of 
the elderly are above age 70, over 40 percent are the old old (above age 85), 
and over two-thirds are female. The number of child respondents in the HRC- 
NBER Child Survey is 850. We  have data for 1,650 children of  the HRCA 
Elderly Survey respondents (including siblings); that is, the 850 child respon- 
dents provided information on themselves plus an additional 800 siblings. 
4.2.2  Sample Section 
The basic sample used in our statistical analysis contains 1,650 children of 
706 elderly respondents. We  excluded observations if  data are missing on a 
child’s age, sex, occupation, health, education, marital status, grades received 
in school, and employment status. We  also excluded children with missing 
information on time provided their parent, children younger than 18 years of 
age, children whose co-residence status with the parent respondent was not 
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4.2.3  Data Characteristics 
Of  the 706 elderly parents in  our sample, 24 percent are age 55-70,  48 
percent are age 71-80,  and 28 percent are 81 and older. The 1,650 children 
(including siblings of the Child Survey respondents) of these parents range in 
age from 18 to 84; 20 percent are under 40, 29 percent are 41-50,  33 percent 
are 51-60,  and 18 percent are 61 and older. Most of  the elderly parents (70 
percent) are female, and most (72 percent) are not married. In contrast, only 
54 percent of children are female, and 76 percent of children are married. On 
average, there are 2.42 children per elderly parent. A total of  21 percent of 
the elderly parents have one child, 32 percent have two children, 23 percent 
have three, and 24 percent have four or more. 
Among elderly who report their total household income, mean income is 
$1 1,247, and median income is $6,250. (These and all subsequent dollar fig- 
ures are in  1987 dollars.) The corresponding figures for child households are 
$34,392 and $32,500, respectively. Among elderly who report total house- 
hold net worth, mean net worth is $93,396 and median net worth is $40,000. 
The corresponding child net worth figures are $175,019 and $125,000, re- 
spectively. 
Many of the elderly in our sample are in poor health; indeed, 13 percent of 
the sample’s elderly are in nursing homes or similar institutions, and 15 per- 
cent  are enrolled in home care programs. In  all, 40 percent of  the elderly 
report their health as fair or poor (as opposed to excellent or good). In terms 
of ADL (activities of daily living) status, 44  percent report difficulty or inabil- 
ity preparing their own meals, 56 percent taking out garbage, 33 percent per- 
forming house chores, 22 percent dressing themselves, 24 percent taking a 
bath or shower, 10 percent getting out of a chair without assistance, 21 percent 
maintaining bladder control, and 28 percent walking up and down stairs with- 
out assistance. 
Not all the children of the elderly are in excellent or good health. A total of 
13 percent of the children report their health (or have their health reported) to 
be either fair or poor. In the case of  the 1,255 spouses of these children, 14 
percent report (or have had reported) their health to be fair or poor. 
In addition to time demands imposed by the elderly parent respondent, the 
children in our survey may need to respond to the time demands by their other 
parent and their parent in-laws. The fraction of children with two parents is 
30 percent. In the case of in-laws, information was obtained only for the child 
respondents; that is, the survey did not ask the child respondents about their 
siblings’ in-laws. For child respondents, the percentage with one or two par- 
ent in-laws is 43 percent, and 33 percent of these in-laws are reported to be in 
fair or poor health. 
A total of 64  percent of the 1,729 children in the sample report (or have had 
reported) that they are employed full time, and 12 percent report (or have had 
reported) that they are employed part time. The average annual wage of chil- 
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wages is $32,914. Unfortunately,  the child survey questionnaire did not ask 
about the wage plus salary of the child respondent and the wage plus salary 
of  the  child  respondent’s  spouse  separately  but  rather  asked  about  com- 
bined  household wage and salary income.  And in the case of  the questions 
about  siblings,  the  survey  asks only  about  the  total  income of  the  sibling 
and the sibling’s spouse; it does not ask about siblings’ wages and salaries sepa- 
rately. 
The wage rate of children is a potentially important explanatory variable for 
estimation of  both our Tobit and our structural models. In the estimation of 
these  models,  we use an  imputed full-time  wage  based  on a regression  of 
wages of child respondents or their spouses who report that they are working 
full time and for whom we can determine  their wages plus salaries.  As an 
example, if the respondent child is married, reports that he or she works full 
time, and also reports that his or her spouse does not work, we know that the 
wages plus salaries of the couple are those of the child respondent.  In this 
wage regression, we use education dummies for years of education, grades in 
school, occupation, sex, health,  and a third-order polynomial in age as ex- 
planatory variables.* 
4.3  Model Estimation 
4.3.1  Tobit Estimates 
The Tobit model can be viewed as a test of a simpler version of the struc- 
tural model presented  above.  It corresponds to  the case that the amount of 
work the child does (which may be zero) is exogenously given and the child 
simply divides his or her nonwork time between leisure and time spent with 
his or her parent.  In his simpler model,  consumption is exogenously deter- 
mined  by  the  sum of  exogenous  nonlabor  plus  labor income,  so the  child 
maximizes 
U, = p log(& -  d,) + lOg(d, + CJtrdJ + m) s.t. d, 2 0, 
2.  There are 157 observations in the auxiliary wage regression. The R’  from the wage regression 
is  .61.  The  coefficients  (standard  errors)  from  this  regression  are  as  follows:  inter- 
cept  =  -28,194.65  (71,464.92);  age  of  child  =  1,017.71  (4,700.80);  age2 =  -5.97 
(104.17); age’  = 0.063 (0.751); dummy  for  one  to  eight years  of education = -  1,599.56 
(6,424.95); dummy  for nine to twelve years of  education =  -960.82  (2,236.20); dummy  for 
reported  health  as  “excellent” = 2,165.11  (1 1,436.56); dummy  for  reported  health  as 
“good’ = -  1,619.78  (11,388.68);  dummy  for  reported  health  as  “fair” =  1,174.45 
(12,058.25);  dummy for reported grade in school as “A”  =  -4,827.79 (12,185.82);  dummy for 
reported grade as “B” = 4,269.33 (I 1,795.60);  dummy for reported grade as “C’  =  1,700.29 
(1  1,654.26);  dummy for reported grade as “D’ = -  7,531.44  (1 1,800.93);  dummy for occupa- 
tion code 2 = 28,664.68 (16,807.28);  dummy for occupation code 3 = 1,588,959  (17,069.44); 
dummy  for  occupation  code  4 = 17,508.99  (17,049.96); dummy  for  occupation  code 
5 = 13,341.80 (16,908.94); dummy for occupation code 6 =  14,808.53 (17,332.27);  dummy 
for occupation code 7 = 13,973.28 (16,926.66);  dummy for male  = 19,662.50  (2,085.96). 118  A. Borsch-Supan, J. Gokhale, L. J. Kotlikoff, and J. N. Morris 
where Xi stands for one minus the exogenously  determined supply of labor. 
For this model, equation (6)  is modified to 
The provision  of  time is positive  if the  square bracket  in (6’)  equals zero, 
and  it  is  zero  if  the  square  bracket  is  negative;  that  is,  d, = 0  if 
0 > [-p(X,+,d,  + m)  + h]/(l - p)  holds,  otherwise  d, = [-p(Z,+,d, 
+ m)  + X]/(l  - p). Let the right-hand  side of  this  last equality equal x: 
y + E,, where x, is a vector of characteristics of  child i and his or her parent 
and includes the amount of time provided to the parent of  his or her siblings 
(E,+,d,),  and where E, is a standard normal error. Then d, equals zero if the 
indicator  function I, = x:y  + E, is negative and equals I, if the indicator is 
positive. But this is the standard Tobit model. Using data on all child respon- 
dents and their siblings and taking, for each observation, the time provided by 
all the other siblings  as one of  the x’s  in the Tobit regression  appear to be 
appropriate provided that the error terms, the E,’s,  are uncorrelated across sib- 
lings. 
Our actual Tobit model is a slight modification of the standard Tobit speci- 
fication to take account of  the 29 percent of children  in our sample whose 
parents live with them. In these cases, it is obvious that the child spends time 
with the parent, but  we are not  sure how to assess the amount of  time. To 
accommodate these data, we assume that the time provided  by  the child is 
positive, but the exact amount of time is unknown. The standard Tobit has two 
pieces of the likelihood function corresponding to the probability of no time 
provided and the probability of a specific amount of time provided. We add to 
the standard likelihood function a statement for the probability of  providing 
positive time, which  is simply one minus the probability of providing zero 
time. 
The time question in the Child Survey that provides the dependent variable 
for our analysis is, “In the last month, how  many  hours did you (and your 
spouse) spend with your parents, visiting, going out together, and/or helping 
him/her/them?’  Of  the 1,179 out of  1,650 children in the Tobit sample who 
indicate they are not living with their respondent parent, 29 percent report (or 
have had reported) spending zero time per month with their elderly parent. 
Another 3  1 percent report spending one to ten hours per month, 18 percent 
eleven to twenty  hours per month, 9 percent twenty-one to thirty hours per 
month, 5 percent thirty-one to forty hours per month, and 8 percent forty-one 
or more hours per month. 
Excluding children living with their parents,  the average number of hours 
provided  per month is fifteen,  and the median number is eight.  Within this 
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by  only children are twenty-four and sixteen, respectively; average and me- 
dian hours (per child) provided by  children with one sibling are sixteen and 
nine, respectively; and average and median hours (per child) provided by chil- 
dren with two or more siblings are twelve and five, respectively. 
Tables 4.1-4.3  report results from Tobit regressions. The first regression 
includes a set of thirty-three regressors (excluding the intercept). It does not, 
however, include the sum of  time provided by  siblings as a regressor, which 
we include in table 4.2. Table 4.3 contains the Tobit results if one excludes 
observations in which children live with their parents. 
Table 4.1  Result from Tobit Regression of Time Spent by  Child with Parent 
against Child and Parent Characteristics 
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-  2.38 




-  .83 
-  13.81 
-2.79 
-  29.73 
-  .24 
-  17.04 
-1.16 
1.72 
-  1.68 
-  1.08 









































-  .65 
3.71 
.07 
-  1.95 
.64 
-  1.88 
-4.13 
-  .41 






-  .91 
-  .47 
2.57 
3.30 
-  .09 
2.57 
-  2.42 
-  1.65 
-  1.70 
-  .05 
-1.10 
-  .67 
.91 
-  .46 
-  .71 
-4.05 
35.72 
Note: Log likelihood function =  -4,342.49.  No.  of observations = 1,650. 120  A. Borsch-Supan, J. Gokhale, L. J. Kotlikoff, and J. N. Morris 
Table 4.2  Result from Regression of Time Spent by Child with Parent against 
Child and Parent Characteristics:  Includes Time Spent by Siblings as 
a Regressor 









































-  2.40 
5.57 
.10 
-  4.15 
I .02 
-  .63 
-  5.45 
-  .67 




-  17.98 
-  7.42 
-  2.50 





-  13.67 
-  2.87 
-  30.34 
-  .40 
-  17.86 
-1.12 
1.68 
-  1.70 
-  1.04 
-  .56 










































-  .70 
3.65 
.05 
-  1.99 
.67 
-  1.55 
-4.11 







-  1.01 






-  1.69 
-  1.74 
-  .09 
-  1.15 
-  .64 
.89 
-  .47 
-  .68 
-4.09 
-  .94 
35.59 
Note:  Log  likelihood function = -4,342.10.  No. of  observations = 1,650. 
In considering the results, it is important to keep in mind, first, that time 
spent with the parent, d, is a censored variable and, second, that the change 
in expected time spent in response to a unit change in  one of  the regressor 
variables is the change in the unconditional expectation E[d,].  Rather than 
report the simple Tobit coefficients, the reported coefficients corresponding to 
the product of Tobit coefficients times the probability that time spent is posi- 121  The Provision of  Time to the Elderly 
Table 4.3  Result from 'Ibbit Regression of Time Spent by Child with Parent 
against Child and Parent Characteristics:  Includes Only Children 
Not Living with Parent 










































-  .76 
-4.62 
1  SO 
-  1.79 
-5.13 
-  .93 





-  1.22 
-  .55 





-  18.81 
-  1.99 
-9.12 
-  1.67 
-20.53 
-  .90 
1.61 
-  1.92 
-  .02 






































-  .52 
.95 
-  1.32 
-  1.69 
1.52 










-  2.06 
-  .69 
-  .22 






-  1.13 
-  .51 
-  .34 
-  1.38 
-  .51 
.83 
-SO 
-  .01 
-  3.84 
31.65 
Note:  Log likelihood function = -4,197.25.  No. of  observations = 1,179. 
tive. By  multiplying the Tobit coefficients by this probability (which, by  the 
way, is evaluated at the sample's mean characteristics), we are simply report- 
ing rescaled Tobit coefficients. The standard errors reported in the tables are 
those of the original (unscaled) coefficients. 
The first set of  regressors in  table 4.1  (MR~-MR~)  are dummies for the 
child's marital status. Married child is the reference case. As would be ex- 
pected,  separatecVdivorced, widowed, and  never-married children provide 122  A. Borsch-Supan, J. Gokhale, L. J. Kotlikoff, and J. N. Morris 
more time to parents. Of these, separated/divorced children provide very little 
additional time compared to married children. Widowed children provide the 
most time to parents.  The coefficients on all three  dummies  are, however, 
insignificant. 
The coefficients on parent’s marital status indicate that, compared to mar- 
ried parents (the reference case), divorcedkeparated parents (PM~)  receive less 
time, but the standard error here is very large. In contrast, widowed parents 
(PM~)  receive substantially more time, and the coefficient is quite significant. 
The next set of dummies P EM^  and  EM^) are coded  1 when the child em- 
ployment  status  is  part  time  (960 hours  per  year)  and  not  working.  The 
dummy for children who have full-time (1,920 hours per year) employment 
status   EM^)  was excluded. As can be expected,  children who are working 
part time provide marginally  more time compared to children  working full 
time. However, contrary to expectations, those who are not working provide 
substantially less time to parents compared to children who are employed full 
time. The former coefficient is insignificant, while the latter is significant at 
almost the 5 percent  level. The dummy  for child’s spouse being employed 
either full time or part time (SEMPL)  is positive.  The coefficient, however, is 
insignificant. 
The next variable (NS)  indicates the number of siblings. A larger number of 
siblings may be expected to reduce the amount of time provided by each child 
since parent dependence on any one child would be lower. Moreover, if sib- 
lings free ride on each other’s time provision to the parent, a larger number of 
siblings would  provide  additional  scope for such free riding  behavior.  The 
regression shows that, after controlling for other influences,  the presence of 
additional siblings reduces the provision of  time to parents  by  about three- 
quarter of  an hour per month for each additional  sibling. The coefficient on 
this variable is significant at the 10 percent level, but not the 5 percent level. 
The dummy for the child’s sex (SEX)  was set to equal one for male children. 
The coefficient suggests that male children who spend time spend about 5.5 
hours less per month than female children who spend time. The parent’s sex 
dummy (PSEX),  which also has a value of one for males, has a negative coef- 
ficient of  -0.62  hours, but it is not significant. 
As expected, the dummy for child’s self-reported health being “poor” (H 14) 
shows a large negative effect on time spent with parent, and the coefficient is 
significant.  “Poor”  health of  spouse  (SPH~)  may be expected to curtail the 
amount of  time  spent by  the child  with the parent.  However, the opposite 
result is obtained from the regression. The coefficient on SPH~  is positive, but 
insignificant.  The variable (PH4) is a dummy for parent’s self-reported health 
status being “poor” As expected, the time provided by children is higher for 
parents whose health status is “poor,” but the coefficient is not significant. 
The variable  PADL is a sum of fourteen dummies,  each having a value of 
one if the parent is unable to perform specific tasks and a value of zero other- 123  The Provision of Time to the Elderly 
wise.3 A larger value of  PADL thus represents a higher degree of  parent dis- 
ability. The coefficient on this variable is positive and significant.  Its value is 
close to one, indicating that for every additional count of disability the child 
spends an additional hour per month with the parent. 
The coefficient on the dummy indicating whether the parent is in a nursing 
home or similar institution (PLV) is large, negative, and quite significant. The 
result suggests that such parents receive substantially less time from their chil- 
dren. A large, negative, and significant effect on child’s time also arises if the 
parent receives services from a home care corporation (PHC). Parents receiv- 
ing “Meals on Wheels” are represented as one in the next dummy variable 
(PWH).  The coefficient is negative, but not significant.  These results suggest 
that children  substitute for their own time by  using  institutions,  home care 
corporations, etc. to care for their elderly parents. 
Older children spend less time with parents, but the coefficient on child’s 
age (AG) is not significant. Older parents receive substantially more time, and 
the coefficient on parent’s age (PAG) is significant. 
The next two dummies (MILH~  and FILH~)  have a value of one if mother-in- 
law’s or father-in-law’s health, as reported by the child, is “poor,” for children 
who have either of  these parents-in-law.  Surprisingly,  the coefficient on the 
former is highly positive  and quite ~ignificant.~  The coefficient on father-in- 
law’s health is negative and insignificant. 
Do children substitute financial transfers for time transfers to parents, and 
do parents buy time from children? The variable  FHLPL is a dummy that as- 
sumes a value of one if the child made positive financial transfers to the parent 
within  the past  year.  According  to the  coefficient on FHLPL,  children  who 
make such transfers spend about eight hours more per month with parents than 
children  who  do not.  The coefficient  on this  variable  is  significant.  The 
dummy indicating whether the parent made a financial transfer to the child 
(PHLPL) has a large negative coefficient, and this too is significant. Both parts 
of the question posed above are thus answered in the negative. 
Higher total income of the parent  (PYV)  when parent income is reported is 
associated with substantially less time devoted by the child to the parent, but 
the coefficient is not significant. Higher total income of the child (KYV) is also 
3. The variable PADL  is the sum of fourteen activity dummies. These dummies had a value of 
one if parent does not go out of building of residence more than once a week; parent does not 
prepare own meals; parent thinks he or she does not get enough to eat; parent does not take out 
garbage himself or herself; parent not healthy enough to do ordinary work around the house; 
parent has problems dressing by himself or herself; parent unable to prepare bath and dry self; 
parent unable to get up out of ordinary chair without help; parent has bladder accidents; parent 
unable to climb up or down stairs without help; parent is confined to bed; parent inclined to wander 
and/or get lost; parent needs constant supervision; parent uses either walker, four-pronged cane, 
crutches, or wheelchair at least some of the time to get around. 
4.  The large positive and significant coefficient on the mother-in-law health dummy does not 
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associated with less time  spent by  the child with  the  parent,  but  again the 
coefficient is insignificant. The signs on both these coefficients are plausible. 
Parents with larger incomes can afford to buy supervisory and care services 
and are, therefore, less dependent on their children, and children with higher 
incomes would be expected to have a higher opportunity cost of time. 
If expectations of bequests are important determinants of parent-child rela- 
tionships,  one would  expect richer parents to receive more time from their 
children and richer children to provide less time to parents. The regression 
indicates that parents with higher net worth (PWLV)  receive more time from 
children and that children with higher net worth (KWLV) spend less time with 
parents. The coefficients on both these variables are, however, insignificant. 
Children with higher wage rates (WAGE)  spend  somewhat less time with 
their parents. The coefficient on the wage rate is quite significant. The size of 
the wage effect seems economically quite large; increasing the child’s wage 
by $10.00 per hour reduces his or her time spent with the parent by 5.5 hours 
per month. 
Table 4.2 repeats the Tobit of table 4.1 but also includes the total amount of 
time provided by siblings (SIBTM)  as a regressor. The introduction of this extra 
regressor does not substantially alter the estimated coefficients and standard 
errors for the rest of the variables. More time provided by siblings (SIBTM)  is 
associated with a very small reduction in the amount of time provided by the 
child, and the coefficient is insignificant. 
Table 4.3 reports Tobit results for the subsample that excludes children who 
live with their parents. There are few noteworthy differences between the re- 
sults of tables 4.1 and 4.3. For example, the variable for number of siblings 
(NS) is significant and larger in absolute value in table 4.3 compared with table 
4.1. The coefficient on the dummy for parents receiving home care services is 
now a much smaller negative number and is insignificant.  Table 4.3 shows a 
much  smaller positive coefficient on the index for parent  disability (PADL), 
and the coefficient is now significant. This indicates that, in the subsample of 
non-co-resident parents and children, children seem to spend very little addi- 
tional time with parents when the degree of parent disability is higher. 
4.3.2  Estimates of the Structural Model 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present maximum likelihood regression results for the 
structural model presented in section 4.1. The data used for this estimation 
are a subsample of 415 respondent children who do not live with their parent 
and for whom valid data on labor and nonlabor income are a~ailable.~  Table 
4.4 presents estimates of  the coefficient vectors  8 and + used to model the 
parameters cx  and p of the utility function. For this analysis, total disposable 
5. Observations were deleted if  data on wage income were positive, but the child’s reported 
employee status indicated whether he or she was working or whether data on wage income were 
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Table 4.4  Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Structural Model 
Equation 1 (0)  Equation 2 (9) 






























5.50  2.61 
-  .79  1.03 
-  1.28  1.29 
.42  1.39 
1.25  1.76 
-  .28  .52 
-  .64  .59 
-  .34  .17 
.23  .46 
.09  .49 
2.38  6.27 
1.26  .83 
-  .41  .96 
.03  .ll 
.33  .80 
.32  .64 
-  .28  1.01 
.06  .65 
-  .37  2.68 
-  1.29  1.22 
-  .03  1.77 
-  1.46  2.23 
.18  .58 
4.38  15.12 
.91  3.27 
.58  .33 
1.72  1.89 
.22  .64 
-  .28  .60 
2.11 
-  .77 
-  .99 
.30 
.71 
-  .54 
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.09 
-.14 
-  1.06 
.02 







-  .46 
5.45 
.21 
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-  .10 
.03 
-  .35 
.29 
.12 
-  1.05 
-.15 
-  .35 
-  1.65 









































-  .58 




-  .97 
-.11 
.24 
-  .32 
.43 
.13 
-  .98 
-  .06 
-  .34 
-  .88 






-  .36 
Note: Log likelihood function  = -  1,600.03. No. of observations = 415. The variables KNLY, 
SIBTM,  and WAGE are part of  the structural specification and have therefore been omitted from x, 
the vector of  characteristics. Work time is endogenous, and therefore EMI and EM2  have been 
omitted from vector x. This subsample has no observation with parent making a financial transfer 
to the child; hence, the variable PHLPL was omitted from vector x. 
time available for an individual per year was taken to be 4,380 hours (assum- 
ing twelve hours of disposable time per day). The estimation procedure as- 
sumes that ki  and ui (i =  1, N)  are independently and identically distributed. 
The vector of child and parent characteristics, x, contains a subset of the vari- 
ables used as regressors in the Tobit model. 
The structural estimates are rather disappointing. With the exception of the 
coefficient on the number of  siblings (NS) in column  1, all the coefficients of 
the structural estimates are insignificant. As a group, however, the coefficients 
seem rather reasonable with respect  to their sign and magnitude.  Since the 126  A. Borsch-Supan, J. Gokhale, L. J. Kotlikoff, and J. N. Morris 
~  ~~ 
Table 4.5  Choices of d and 1 Implied by Estimated Parameters 
Time Spent with Parents  Leisure 
New Value  Diff.  New  Value  Diff. 
At mean values 
MR2  =  1 
MR3  =  1 
MR4  =  1 
PM2  = 1 
PM3  = 1 
SEMPL = 1 
NS = 1 
NS = 2 
NS = 3 
NS  = 4 
NS = 5 
NS = 6 
NS = 7 
SEX  = 1 
PSEX  =  1 
~14  = 1 
SPH4  = 1 
PH4  = 1 
PADL  = 0 
PADL  = 3 
PADL = 6 
PADL  = 9 
PADL  = 12 
PLV  = 1 
PHC = 1 
PWH  1 
MILH4  =  1 
FILH4  = 1 
FHLPL =  1 
child’s age = mean age + 10 
child’s age = mean age - 10 
parent age = mean age + 10 
parentage  = meanage - 10 
parent income = mean income 
parent income = mean income 
child’s wealth = mean wealth 
child’s wealth = mean wealth 
parent wealth = mean wealth 
parent wealth = mean wealth 
WAGE = mean wage  + 5 
+  2,000 
- 2,000 
+  10,000 
- 10,Ooo 














































-  50 
-  50 
15 
43 







-  47 
-  22 
-  50 




-  18 
-  33 
-  47 
-  26 






-  20 
65 








3,368  0 
2,303  -  1,065 
2,152  -  1,216 
2,822  -  546 
3,242  -  126 
3,245  -  123 
3,225  -  143 
3,432  64 
3,318  -  50 
3,190  -  178 
3,045  -  323 
2,883  -  485 
2,699  -  669 
2,495  -  873 
2,984  -  384 
3,185  -  183 
4,380  1,012 
4,380  1,012 
3,030  -  338 
3,357  -  11 
3,369  1 
3,380  12 
3,390  22 
3,400  32 
3,875  507 
3,426  58 
2947  -421 
4,143  775 
3,103  -  265 
2,232  -1,136 
3,663  295 
3,028  -  340 
3,317  -51 
3,409  41 
3.376  8 
3,361  -7 
3,373  5 
3.363  -5 
3,368  0 
3,369  1 
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Table 4.5  (continued) 
Time Spent with Parents  Leisure 
New Value  Diff.  New Value  Diff. 
WAGE = mean wage -  5  56  6  3,464  96 
SIBTM  = SIBTM  + 20  31  -  19  3,382  14 
SIBTM  = SIBTM -  20  69  19  3,355  -  13 
KNLY  = KNLY  + 2,000  54  4  3,435  67 
KNLY  = KNLY -  2,000  46  -4  3,302  -  66 
Note: Standard errors in this table are proportional to those of table 5. 
coefficients in table 4.4 are hard to interpret, we consider how changes in the 
exogenous variables  affect the mean amount of  time spent with parents and 
the mean amount of leisure predicted by the structural model. To  do this, we 
use the estimated values 6 Ad  and the mean values of the vector x to obtain 
an estimate (at the mean of the x’s) of the preference parameters a  and p.6  The 
optimal choices of the time transfer to parent (d)  and the amount of  leisure (e) 
can then be inferred by setting the terms within the square brackets of (5) and 
(6) equal to zero and simultaneously  solving the two resultant equations.  If 
the optimal choice of d turns out to be negative, a comer solution is imposed 
by setting d equal to zero and recomputing the optimum amount of  leisure. 
The first row of table 4.5 presents the choices of time spent with the parent 
and leisure for, again, a hypothetical child with a characteristic vector x equal 
to the mean of x computed over the 415 observations. Out of  a total of 4,380 
hours per year, a hypothetical individual with mean characteristics spends 50 
hours per year with the parent, consumes 3,368 hours of  leisure per year, and 
works for the remaining 962 hours. Subsequent rows of table 4.5 present the 
amount of  time spent with parents and the amount of leisure of the hypotheti- 
cal child that result from changing the value of one of the elements in vector x 
while maintaining the others at their mean values. The columns labeled “Diff.” 
indicate the change in time spent with parents and leisure from the respective 
values in the first row of the table. 
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Many of the results found in the Tobit analysis carry over to the structural 
estimates. For example, male children spend less time; divorced, separated, 
or widowed children spend substantially more time; children in  poor health 
provide less time; parents in nursing homes receive less time; parents in poor 
health receive more time; and older parents receive more time. Surprisingly, 
and in contradiction to earlier results, table 4.5 shows that the time spent by 
children declines,  and the amount of  leisure consumed increases, with  in- 
creasing degree of disability (PADL) of the parent. 
The negative effect of time spent by siblings on the time spent by the child 
reflects the structural model’s assumption that siblings play noncooperative 
Nash in providing time to their parents and respond to increased time by their 
siblings by cutting back on their own time. 
4.4  Conclusion 
This paper uses matched data on the elderly and their children to study the 
provision of time by children to the elderly. It develops a Tobit model as well 
as a structural model to analyze the determinants of this decision. The data 
reveal some clear patterns of time transfers from children to their elderly par- 
ents. Children appear to use institutions and home care as a substitute for their 
own provision of time. Parents who reside in nursing homes or are enrolled in 
home care programs receive, ceteris paribus, less than half the amount of time 
received by  those in the community. The provision of time is strongly corre- 
lated with the age of the elderly parent; other things being equal, the old old 
receive over twice the time of the young old. 
The sex, age, and health status of children are additional important deter- 
minants of time provided to the elderly. Male children and younger children 
spend relatively little time with their parents. Children with poor health spend 
almost no time with their parents. If the spouse of the child is in poor health, 
the child also gives very little time, at least according to the structural model’s 
results. 
Other things being equal, those elderly who report their health to be “poor” 
appear to receive over twice the amount of time received by elderly with better 
self-reports of  health. Surprisingly, the degree of  elderly disability does not 
appear to affect the amount of  time provided to those elderly not living with 
their children, although it is a significant determinant in the larger sample that 
includes elderly living with their children. 
The Tobit results for the entire sample of children, including those living 
with their elderly parents, indicate that more time is provided by  single chil- 
dren and more time is received by  single elderly, at least those who are wid- 
owed. In  the structural model, the effects of  the child’s and parent’s marital 
status on time provided to the elderly are less clear, but there is strong evi- 
dence that widowed children spend substantially more time with their elderly 
parents. 129  The Provision of Time to the Elderly 
The structural model predicts that more time provided by siblings will lead 
to substantially less time provided by  the child in question. However, this 
prediction is, to a large extent, simply the implication of the form of the struc- 
tural model we have adopted. In the less constrained Tobit estimation, there is 
no evidence that siblings free ride on each others’ provision of time. 
Both the Tobit and the structural estimates indicate a small effect associated 
with  higher children’s wage rates; children with higher wage rates provide 
somewhat less time to their elderly parents than other children. In contrast to 
the modest effect of higher wage rates, the effect of larger values of children’s 
wealth is quite sizable. Wealthier children and children with higher incomes 
appear to  provide  less  time  than  poorer children,  but  the  standard  errors 
around these effects are quite large. 
The standard errors on the effects of parent’s wealth and income are also 
sizable. One might summarize the findings here by  saying that there is cer- 
tainly no strong evidence that richer parents receive more time than poorer 
parents; that is, the paper provides little, if any, support for Bernheim, Shlei- 
fer, and Summers’s (1986) view that richer parents, in effect, purchase more 
time from their children. 
To summarize, the results indicate that the main determinants of the amount 
of time given to parents are demographic. Economic variables, such as wage 
rate and income levels, appear to play an insignificant role in the provision of 
time by children to their elderly parents. 
Appendix 
Key to Variables Used in Tobit Regressions 
MR~  = 1 if child is separatedldi- 
vorced; 
MR~  = 1 if child is widowed; 
MU  = 1 if child is never mar- 
ried; 
PM~  = 1 if parent is divorcedl 
separated; 
PM~  = 1 if parent is widowed; 
 EM^  = 1 if child is employed 
 EM^  = 1 if child is not working 
SEMP~  = 1 if child’s spouse is em- 
ployed full or part time; 
NS = number of siblings; 
SEX  = 1 if child is male; 
PSEX =  1 if parent is male; 
part time; 
~14  =  1 if child rates his or her 
health as “poor”; 
SPH~  = 1 if child’s spouse’s 
health is “poor”; 
PH~  = 1 if parent rates his or her 
health as “poor”; 
text); 
ing home or similar insti- 
tution; 
PHC  =  1 if parent receives home 
care services; 
PWH  = 1 if parent receives 
“Meals on Wheels”; 
AG  = child’s age divided by 50; 
PADL  = index of disability (see 
PLV  =  1 if parent lives in nurs- 130  A. Borsch-Supan, J. Gokhale, L. J. Kotlikoff, and J. N.  Morris 
PAG  = 
MILH4 = 
FILH4  = 
FHLPL  = 
PHLPL  = 
PYM  = 
PYV  = 
KYM = 
parent’s age divided by 
50; 
1 if mother-in-law’s 
health is reported “poor”; 
1 if father-in-law’s health 
is reported “poor”; 
1 if child made financial 
transfers to parent within 
the last year; 
1 if parent made financial 
transfers to child within 
the last year; 
1 if data on parent’s total 
income are missing; 
parent’s total income 
times one minus PYM (in 
$1OO,OOo); 
1 if data on child’s total 
income are missing; 
KYV  = 
PWLM  = 
PWLV  = 
KWLM  = 
KWLV  = 
WAGE  = 
SIBTM  = 
KNLY = 
SIG2  = 
child’s total income times 
one minus KYM (in 
1 if data on net worth of 
parent are missing; 
parent’s net worth times 
one minus PWLM (in 
$500,000); 
1 if data on net worth of 
child are missing; 
child’s net worth times 
one minus KWLM (in 
$500,000); 
child’s wage rate 
(unit = $10.00 per 
hour); 
total time provided by 
siblings of child; 
nonlabor income of child; 
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Comment  Konrad stah1 
Recent research on transfers between the elderly and their offspring has con- 
centrated almost exclusively on bequests. ’ By contrast, research on inter vivos 
intergenerational transfers has been scanty, probably largely because of lack 
of adequate data. Such transfers may take place in terms of income and assets 
or of  time provided by  children (and their dependents) to their parents (or 
grandparents), and vice versa. Axel Borsch-Supan, Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laur- 
ence J. Kotlikoff, and John N. Morris concentrate on a component of  these 
transfers important from both a strictly economic and a social policy point of 
view, namely, transfers in the form of time provided by children in taking care 
of  their parents. The 1986 HRCA Survey of  the Elderly combined with the 
1986 HRC-NBER Child Survey provides a unique opportunity for such an 
analysis within a cross-sectional framework. 
The empirical analysis, which is the focus of the paper, is based on a com- 
pact cross-sectional structural model of  a child’s decision-making behavior 
with the following key features. First, the shares of time apportioned to both 
labor/leisure and parent care are endogenous. Second, these shares may  be 
subject to comer solutions: the child may choose not to work or  devote time 
to the parent. By assumption, financial transfers to the parent(s) are excluded 
from the child’s choices, as are all choices on the parent side. 
These assumptions are partially motivated by  observations from the data 
set: the financial transfers found therein are rather small.* Nevertheless, trun- 
cating these choices may result in simultaneity biases of several kinds. First, 
any substitution between children’s time transfers and monetary transfers to 
finance nursing home or home care services is assumed away. Second, trad- 
ing, on the part of the parents, inter vivos financial transfers for the provision 
of time by  their children is not possible. However, while these transfers are 
excluded in the theoretical model, they are included in all estimates, even the 
one based on the structural model. At  any rate, a final aspect of  the model 
specification worth emphasizing is that the simultaneity in  several siblings’ 
choice of time provided to parents is rather parsimoniously accounted for. So 
much for the theoretical model. 
The first part of the empirical results is on Tobit estimates on the allocation 
Konrad Stahl is professor of economics at the University of Mannheim, Germany. 
1. The pertinent literature is competently reviewed  by  Michael D. Hurd, “Research on the 
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of children’s nonwork time between leisure and time spent with the parent, 
with an exogenous specification of time worked. Here, the authors are con- 
fronted with the problem that in almost one-third of their sample the parents 
live with their children, in which case the  assessment  of  time provided  by 
them is difficult. They elegantly resolve this problem by adding to the stan- 
dard Tobit likelihood function a statement on the probability of the child pro- 
viding  positive time, equaling  one minus the probability  of  providing zero 
time. 
The basic estimate including this subsample is presented in table 4.1. With 
twenty-nine independent variables (excluding the intercept and dummies con- 
trolling for missing values), that estimate is not quite parsimonious. Its inter- 
pretation  is  not  transparent  and  does  not  sufficiently  account  for  the 
(in)significance associated with the individual variables.  I therefore summa- 
rize the results before commenting on them. 
The  set  of  independent  variables  may  be  organized  into  four  groups, 
namely, nine  variables  related  to parent’s  and  child’s economic status,  two 
variables on intergenerational financial transfer decisions taken by both parent 
and child, ten variables reporting demographic aspects, six on health status, 
and finally three reporting substitutes to child’s time and are consumed by the 
parent( s). 
Of  the nine economic status variables,  only one, the child’s opportunity 
cost of devoting time to the parent approximated by the wage rate, is signifi- 
cant  with  the  expected  negative  sign.  In  particular,  both  intergenerational 
transfer variables  are significant but with the wrong sign. Of the ten demo- 
graphic variables,  four are significant  with  the expected  sign: “parent wid- 
owed” and “parent age” exercise a positive effect, and “child male” a negative 
effect. The negative effect of the number of siblings is also weakly significant, 
with only a small effect on child’s time devoted to parent care. 
Two out of the  six health  variables, “child’s health  status” and  “parent’s 
degree of disability,” show, respectively, the significant negative and positive 
sign.  The large difference  in the  magnitude of effect remains unexplained. 
Two of the three variables on the consumption of substitute services, “parent 
living in nursing home” and “parent receiving home care services ,” are signif- 
icant with the expected negative sign, with a much stronger effect of the for- 
mer variable. 
In all, noneconomic,  that is, demographic  health  and real consumption- 
related variables exercise a much stronger effect than economic ones, a finding 
not uncommon in research on aging3 
The current model specification contains no interactions; not even obvious 
ones such as those between child’s sex, age, and employment status. One also 
3. Compare, e.g., Borsch-Supan,  Hajivassiliou, Kotlikoff, and Moms (in this volume); and 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff and John N. Morris, “Why Don’t the Elderly Live with Their Children: A 
New Look,” Issues in the Economics of  Aging, ed. David A. Wise (Chicago: University of  Chi- 
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expects a combined effect-if  both parents are alive-of  parents’ health sta- 
tus; indeed,  it remains unclear in this case whose health status is reported in 
the data. 
It is furthermore puzzling that several variables referring to economic status 
are significant  with the wrong  sign. For instance,  we expect a significantly 
increased amount of time spent with the parent if the child is not working (in 
particular if the child is female) or if the child made financial transfers to the 
parent, thus providing the financial means to purchase substitutes for personal 
care. We may also expect substitution away from parent’s care to the care of 
in-laws, while the signs of these variables are conflicting. Finally, one would 
expect effects from important  variables  that  are insignificant  in the present 
estimate,  such as “child  widowed,”  “poor health of child’s spouse,” and the 
other substitute variables for child’s care taking. 
How do the results given by the authors relate to the sparse literature on 
intergenerational transfers of time? The closest paper to the present one is by 
Bernheim,  Shleifer,  and Sutnmer~.~  These authors consider the strategic use 
of bequests by parents in order to extract services from their children. They 
show a significantly positive relation between bequeathable wealth and chil- 
dren’s attention, especially if there are several children. On the basis of empir- 
ical observations, they also reject the use of inter vivos transfers for the same 
purpose.  The latter result contradicts the present estimate,  as this  shows a 
strong positive effect of parent-child transfers. 
However, a strategic bequest motive does not show up at all in the present 
estimate.  Neither parent total income (as a proxy for lifetime earnings) nor 
parent net worth exercise the positive influence on child’s time spent, as em- 
phasized by Bernheim et al. Furthermore, while only weakly significant, the 
negative coefficient on the number of siblings in the present estimate indicates 
a negative effect on the individual child’s time spent with the parent,  rather 
than the strong positive one derived by Bernheim et al. rationalized by com- 
petition for bequests. It remains open whether the results presented here carry 
more the flavor of the altruistic rather than the strategic bequest motivation for 
intergenerational time transfers. 
As the inclusion of the cases where parents live with their children is econ- 
ometrically more appealing, it is not too surprising that the estimates exclud- 
ing these cases perform worse. Table 4.3,  corresponding to table 4.1, exhibits 
that a mere four out of the eleven  variables  significant  in the first estimate 
remain  so.  One of  them,  “number  of  siblings,”  now  turns  out  to  have  a 
strongly significant  negative effect, while  it was only weakly significant be- 
fore. Several variables, such as “child not working,” and transfers from and to 
parent, now show up significant with the wrong sign. 
It is surprising and unfortunate that the results are even weaker in the theo- 
4. See B. Douglas  Bernheim,  Andrei  Shleifer, and  Lawrence H. Summers, “The Strategic 
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retically more satisfying second part of the estimates based on the structural 
model. They are presented in table 4.4. Essentially none of the independent 
variables remains significant. In fact, only one single parameter, “number of 
siblings,” has the expected sign while obtaining a t-value above unity. There- 
fore, the numerical estimates on the effect of the exogenous variables on the 
child’s choice of  leisure time and time devoted to parents presented  in table 
4.5 lack statistical foundation and can be considered preliminary  at best.  Of 
course, the same holds for the comparisons of  the estimates from the struc- 
tural model with the (many) insignificant ones from the Tobit model. 
It remains to speculate about the reasons for the weakness, especially of the 
structural estimate, despite an attractively  simple specification of the under- 
lying theoretical model.  The Tobit estimate could possibly  be improved by 
introducing interaction variables as discussed before, by adding explanatory 
variables such as the geographical distance between child’s and parent’s living 
quarters, or by respecifying the opportunity costs of  physical contact, espe- 
cially  for the nonworking  child, for whom  at present no variable reflecting 
opportunity costs enters the estimation. For instance, there may be other de- 
mands on personal time transfers, in particular by the child’s dependents. 
Without  further  insight  into  the  technicalities  of  the  estimation  beyond 
those given in the paper, it remains unclear why the estimate of the structural 
model performs so drastically worse than that of the Tobit model. It is concep- 
tually  not  difficult,  as usual,  to suggest the  endogenization of  further vari- 
ables. In particular,  the parents’ choices of  substitutes to the child’s time and 
care are rather obvious  candidates, possibly  including the  choice of  living 
arrangements. The results of the Tobit estimate already indicate a strong inter- 
action.  This is not the case for the monetary transfers  chosen by the child. 
This inconclusive result may well be due to the notorious paucity of survey 
data  in  recording  such  transfers.  Nevertheless,  the  choice  of  time  versus 
money transfers is logically a simultaneous one. At any rate, it remains to be 
shown whether respecifications of the model along these lines will lead to a 
substantial improvement of its estimate. The quality of the data may put effec- 
tive limits on the estimation for such a relatively delicate structural model. 
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize again that the authors have chosen 
to concentrate on an important component of  intergenerational  transfers  but 
that substantially more work is needed to achieve satisfactory results on the 
topic. 